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What will China be like at the millenium's close? China may be the
most changing nation on Earth, with few definite landmarks to guide
analysis of political and economic developments. One's perspective is
important: up too close, one sees the eddies of intrigue which occasion-
ally topple someone in high office; too far back, one can miss the ex-
traordinary significance of what is happening in China at this point in
history.
This discussion has limited goals. Under examination is the strik-
ingly anamolous introduction of competitive economic forces into a high-
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technology service sector: aviation. The approach of this examination is
to inquire into the development of legal systems regulating that competi-
tion. Part I establishes the theoretical principles of the recent economic
reforms in China. Part II describes the manifold changes in China's avi-
ation industry. Part III offers some restrained comments regarding what
these changes may, in light of the past, signify for China's future.
I. THE REGULATED COMPETITIVE ECONOMY OF MODERN CHINA
A. The Chinese Concept of Competition Under Law
According to recent pronouncements, since the founding of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China thirty-eight years ago, the economy has failed to
meet the dreams of its leaders and the needs of its people. There are
many reasons for this-historical, political, and ideological. The major
economic cause recognized by the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China ("Central Committee")1 is "a rigid economic structure
that cannot meet the needs of the growing forces of production." 2 Spe-
cifically: 1) no clear distinction has been drawn between the functions of
the government and those of the enterprise; 2) barriers exist between dif-
ferent departments or regions; and 3) the state has exercised excessive
and rigid control over enterprises.
These problems of economic structure have deprived enterprises of
necessary decision-making power with a resultant loss of vitality to the
society as a whole. The legal system enforced this rigidity by imposing
unreasonable restraints on economic activity. Thus, there existed a di-
rect causal connection between the dependent legal status of enterprises
and the loss of opportunity to engage in economic activity in light of
specific situational attributes and the consequent failures of the Chinese
economy.3 Therefore, it was thought that advanced methods of eco-
nomic organization were necessary in order to bring about a radical
change in the economic structure that could unimpede development and
modernization.'
A critical issue that has been squarely faced by the Central Commit-
tee is the role of competition in the modern socialist planned economy.
1 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of the Eco-
nomic Structure (Adopted by the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Third
Plenary Session), Oct. 20, 1984 [hereinafter Decision].
2 Id.
3 Huang, On the Legal Problems in the Reforms of the Economic System, STUDIES IN LAW
(1985).
4 Decision, supra note 1.
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Simply stated, enterprises are to be put to the test of direct judgment by
consumers in the marketplace so that only the best survive. This policy
is intended to help break the monopoly blockade hampering the growth
of production and to stimulate enterprises to improve technology opera-
tion and management. Yet Chinese decisionmakers apparently realize
that the advent of competition calls for regulatory law to channel com-
petitive forces into socially productive uses and to punish anticompetitive
conduct.5 Thus, where the law had served to impede progress by stultify-
ing individual initiative, the law must now encourage progress by estab-
lishing just rules of competitive rivalry.
The concept of competition under law has two fundamental mean-
ings in the context of Chinese modernization. First, and most important,
it means that there will be a decoupling of state authority from en-
trepreneurial management. Second, it means that a plurality of eco-
nomic actors will participate in the same markets and will have to rely on
their skill, ingenuity, and business acumen to survive subject to the right
of other competitors to do the same. These two meanings may be differ-
entiated, but they share the mutual need for legal principles to establish
the outer boundaries of acceptable economic activity.
This is an important starting point to establish. No technologically
advanced society has a "free market" in the sense that private entrepre-
neurs have unfettered decision-making authority. Certainly in capitalist
societies, entrepreneurs are restrained by state-imposed obligations to the
social welfare and are limited by legal definitions of what constitutes per-
missible competitive conduct toward other participants in the market.
Competition does not mean the absence of regulation. On the contrary,
competition and regulation are literally two dimensions of the same phe-
nomenon sharing the same goals. Competition is rivalry according to
rules; regulation is the legal process of developing and enforcing those
rules in a just manner.
To understand the regulated competitive economy of modern China,
it is necessary to distinguish its legal underpinnings from those of an
economy operated as a governmental monopoly. At root, in the competi-
tive economy there are very strict limits as to what the government may
consider a matter for its concern, and acts outside these limits are there-
fore redressable only in a private legal proceeding. Ironically, the key to
understanding what is meant by free competition is to recognize that
governmental authority, like private authority, is subject to legal limits.
In contradistinction to the historical Chinese experience, a competitive
5 Wang, On Legal Adjustment of Enterprise Competition, JURISPRUDENCE (Mar. 1985).
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system demands that the state forsake a position of omniscience regard-
ing economic activity and accept a limited role as planner and regulator.
This explains why the current effort toward modernization is so impor-
tant: it signifies a profound recognition both of the necessity for govern-
mental regulation of the modern economy under law as well as the
necessity to draw a line of demarcation between the functions of state
organs and the private enterprise's power of operations.
B. Delineating State from Private Decision-Making Authority
The Twelfth Central Committee identified that growth requires state
management, inspection, and regulation of economic enterprises. More
specifically, the state was instructed to: 1) use taxation and other means
to concentrate in its treasury that part of enterprises' net incomes which
should be used by the state in a unified way; 2) designate, appoint, and
remove the leading members of the enterprises or approve their employ-
ment and election; and 3) determine the establishment of enterprises,
their removal to other places, their switching to other lines of products,
their merger with other enterprises, suspension of operations, and closing
down.6 But no direct interference in enterprises' specific economic activi-
ties is to be allowed, especially in their productive management. The
reason for this limitation is the realization that the complexity and
changeability of social demand means that no state institution can know
enough to cope with differing conditions in time. Without this limita-
tion, the result has been "serious subjectivism and bureaucratism, with a
consequent suppression of enterprise vitality."7
Formerly, central and local governments took responsibility for too
many of the details of economic activity which rendered enterprises de-
pendent on relationships with political authorities and increased the diffi-
culties of management.8 To reform this system, the Twelfth Central
Committee decided to reduce the scope of mandatory planning while ex-
tending guidance planning. Mandatory planning will be applied to major
products which have a direct bearing on the national economy and the
people's livelihood and which have to be allocated and distributed by the
state, as well as major service sectors that affect the entire economy.
Simpler and more numerous economic activities should either come
under guidance planning or be left entirely to the operation of the mar-
6 Decision, supra note 1.
7 Id.
8 Review of Forum on the Functions of the Government, British Broadcasting Corp.; Summary of




ket, as the case may require. The focus of planning will be shifted to
medium- and long-term planning, and annual plans will be appropriately
simplified. There should be a corresponding reform of planning meth-
ods. Full attention should be paid to economic information and forecast-
ing so as to raise the scientific level of planning.9 As one Chinese
commentator has observed:
The dependent legal status of enterprises weakened the proper function of
state organs in managing the economy. The fundamental measures which
can change this situation are to define properly the power of government
departments and affirm that power in legal form. This redefinition is in line
with the principle of separating the function of government and enterprises,
streamlining administration, and instituting decentralization. If the eco-
nomic administrative organ oversteps its authority or improperly exercises
it with the result that the enterprise is injured, it should be liable for
damages. 10
The primary attribute of the modem Chinese economy is the re-
placement of the government by independent enterprises which will be-
come the primary economic creators-that is, makers of new products,
appliers of new technologies, entrants into new markets, and exploiters of
new resources. To a great extent, Chinese economic reforms are pre-
mised on the raising of a new generation of entrepreneurs who are capa-
ble of breaking with the past. Chinese entrepreneurs, however, have not
had sufficient independence to operate and manage their enterprises."
To remedy this impediment, the new reforms give the managers of enter-
prises six powers:
1) Production planning power to adopt flexible and diversified
forms of operation, supply, and marketing;
2) Treasury power to keep and budget retained earnings;
3) Personnel power to appoint and remove employees;
4) Labor management power to decide how to recruit and use
its work force and to determine wages and rewards;
5) Distribution power to determine the quantity, timing, and
profits of contracts with other enterprises;
6) Power to set prices.
With power over production, enterprises may plan in view of their
actual situation, revise specifications and variety, and more efficiently sat-
isfy consumer needs. Overstocking of production, which has been a seri-
ous problem in the Chinese economy, should be alleviated by this
9 Decision, supra, note 1.
10 Huang, supra note 3.
11 'Renmin Ribao' Publishes the Views of 30 Entrepreneurs, British Broadcasting Corp.; Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Dec. 23, 1986, at FE/8449/BII/1 (NEXIS library, BBCSWB file).
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transfer of planning power. With the financial power, enterprises can
rely on the necessary capital for their activities without fear of unreason-
able restraints imposed by administrative interference. Thus, enterprises
should be able to arrange their funds according to their needs of opera-
tion. Other than exercising its power to tax, the state should not inter-
fere with this aspect of management. The personnel power and the
power to allocate the labor force do not conflict with the workers' role as
masters of the economy, but are intended to ensure that workers enjoy
legitimate material interest and honors in the success of the enterprise.
Thus, absolute egalitarianism in the distribution of economic rewards is
inappropriate. The distribution power extends the decision-making
power of enterprises to contracts with other enterprises. For instance,
enterprises should now be permitted to sell excess stock at reduced prices
and to dispose of replaced fixed assets as necessary. Finally, the power to
set prices means that, for the Chinese consumer, the marketplace will be
a signal of competitive differentiation both as to efficiency of production
and as to the desirability of the product.
In short, the enterprise should be truly made a relatively independent eco-
nomic entity and should become a producer and operator of socialist com-
modity production that is independent and responsible for its own profit
and loss, is capable of transforming and developing itself, and acts as a legal
person with certain rights and duties. This is the way to ensure both overall
unity of the growth of the national economy as a whole and the diversity
and flexibility of individual enterprises in production and management as
well as their desire to make progress.
12
C. Limits of Acceptable Competitive Conduct
In the Chinese socialist system, competition is the external expres-
sion of the law of value and an objective economic measurement. Com-
petition separates the advanced from the backward enterprises and
allows the former to succeed. Competition permits enterprises whose
products will not sell and enterprises with excessive debt to go bankrupt.
Modern competition involves the use of new technology, exploitation of
new products, and new methods of scientific management. Therefore,
legal regulation of economic competition should encourage technological
reform, replacement of products, and improvement of management.
13
The antithesis of competition is monopoly. Marx cautioned that
one of the preconditions of making the mutual exchange prices of com-
modities approximately meet their values is the absence of monopoly
which could compel higher prices or lower value. Monopoly has two
12 Decision, supra note 1.
13 Wang, supra note 5.
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forms of expression: administrative monopoly and economic monopoly.
The former refers to the prohibition of competition through command of
competent legal authority. For instance, a regional blockade refers to
prohibitions against entry by competitors from other parts of the country
in order to protect local producers from competition. The result is mar-
ket division with its concomitant anticompetitive effects.14 The State
Council has strictly forbidden territorial blockades, but this prohibition
is not vigorously enforced.
Economic monopoly refers to agreements among competitors which
tend either to raise prices or to exclude other competitors. In the context
of the Chinese marketplace, where cooperation is a strongly cherished
virtue, it is difficult to distinguish between agreements which are advan-
tageous to the development of commerce and those agreements which
merely restrain competition. Thus, criteria are needed to determine what
types of agreements are reasonable and what types of agreements are mo-
nopolistic. While the list of potentially anticompetitive agreements is
probably infinite, Chinese observers have tended to focus on the follow-
ing four practices.
1) Tying arrangements whereby the seller of a desired commod-
ity conditions the sale of that commodity on the purchase of another
undesired commodity. The cause of such arrangements lies in the
inability of the planned economy to cope with goods in excess sup-
ply. Consequently, sellers of goods with limited consumer demand
attempt to unload these products by tying them to faster selling
products. In 1981, the Ministry of Commerce issued a regulation
prohibiting product tying.15 This policy was reinforced in 1986
when the State Council issued a policy circular against tying
arrangements.
14 The recent "ginseng war" in Shanghai demonstrates such restraints in action. In late 1984,
the Shanghai Ministry of Industry and Commerce permitted producers of ginseng from JiLing and
HeiLongJiang provinces to sell their product which was priced lower, yet reputedly of better quality,
than Shanghai ginseng. Complaints from sellers of Shanghai ginseng, however, caused the ministry
to suspend this permission while the ginseng's quality was verified. When a testing center in Shang-
hai established that the competitive product was of equal quality, the suspension was lifted. In April
1986 the Shanghai authorities ordered that all ginseng sold in the Shanghai market must be uniform
in quality and price. This policy effectively foreclosed non-Shanghai producers from the market.
15 The Regulation on Strictly Forbidding Product Tying provides that: 1) every distribution and
resale enterprise shall organize to avoid overstocking of products and every enterprise has the right
to refuse to purchase unmarketable products or products of low quality; 2) it is strictly illegal to tie
high-quality goods to lower-quality items either at the distribution or resale level. Unmarketable
goods can be consigned to the reseller who then acts as a commission agent in their sale; 3) whenever
a distributor or retailer confronts a tying practice the buyer may refuse to accept the goods and may
report the incident to superiors; and 4) the Ministry of Commerce shall investigate all complaints of
tying practices and may issue disciplinary warnings where warranted.
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2) Payment of sales rebates whereby sellers promote their goods
by compensating purchasers directly rather than lowering price or
improving quality. Again, the problem stems from oversupply of
unwanted items which congest the marketplace.
3) Interference with contractual relations whereby consumers
are lured away from one enterprise, not because of the inferiority of
that enterprise's products or its prices, but because the competing
enterprise has disparaged the original seller or in some way coerced
the purchaser to change suppliers. Also included in this category is
false advertising whereby the seller attracts consumers with untrue
assertions regarding the product.
4) Theft of trade secrets or trademarks in which the creative
forces necessary for effective competition are rendered useless to the
original seller because a competitor has either taken advantage of
the goodwill inherent in the creator's trademark or has succeeded in
copying the creation. Such theft can occur because the competitor
gains direct access to the creative producer's facilities, because the
competitor is able to take advantage of an unfair relationship with
administrative authorities, or because the competitor hires away key
employees of the creative producer. Regardless of the method em-
ployed, such theft is difficult to control in the absence of legal pro-
tections for trade secrets or trademarks.
The consequence of these concerns is that, in order to establish a
competitive market in China, a regulatory system must be instituted
which: 1) prevents administrative authorities from interfering with the
free play of competitive forces throughout the national economy; and 2)
channels entrepreneurial activity into competitively advantageous efforts.
D. Applications and Impacts of the Initial Reforms
In the regulated competitive economy of China, independent en-
trepreneurial decision-making remains subject to the guidance of state
planning and administrative management. In attempting to move from a
restrictive and hierarchical system of management to a more democratic
system, Chinese authorities have recognized the need for a gradual intro-
duction of major changes. Accordingly, the commodity economy has
been divided into three. categories.
The first category consists of agricultural production, production of
small articles of daily use, and enterprises engaging in service and repair.
A principal contribution of the Eleventh Central Committee was to sub-
ject industrial sectors in this category to managerial independence and
marketplace competition. Enterprises are permitted to raise funds
Chinese Aviation Reform
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needed for expanding production by issuing shares of ownership stock.
The government only assigns guidance planning to these enterprises and
allows them to participate competitively in their markets. For industries
in this category, production and operation can be suited to the complex
and changing demand of consumers and the initiative of individual pro-
ducers.16 As is widely known, this has been China's major success story.
The average annual growth rate of agricultural output value since the
reforms enacted by the Eleventh Central Committee has exceeded 10%
with production of nearly all goods in excess of planned targets. More to
the point, most localities have basically solved the problem of having
enough for people to eat and wear.
17
Enterprises in the second category are large-sized enterprises in
metal smelting, machine building, and heavy industries. While their
means of production are state-owned, they are allowed to compete on the
basis of different quality and price. The government's managerial role
stresses guidance rather than mandatory planning, preferring indirect to
direct legal controls. The introduction of independent entrepreneurial
management and competitive markets has been distinctly slower here
than in the first category. However, spurred by the demands of foreign
competition and the need for export trade primarily with regard to the
products of industry, measures have been taken to adopt competitive re-
forms. The result has similarly been an increase in production in excess
of planned targets with notable increases in the design of light and textile
industrial products where the reforms have been most strongly felt.1
8
Enterprises in the third category are not considered producers of
commodities; consequently, competition has no role and the distribution
of the goods produced by these enterprises is not regulated by market
forces but by mandatory government planning. Included in this category
are mining, banking, the military industries, railway transport, posts and
telecommunications, large electrical installations, as well as land and for-
estry. The means of production here are exclusively the province of state
ownership and control.
The progress of Chinese economic reforms can be measured as the
spread of entrepreneurial management and competitive market regula-
tion from industries of the first category to industries of the second cate-
gory and the simultaneous recategorization of industrial sectors from the
third to second category and from the second to the first. The aviation
16 Review of Forum, supra note 8.
17 Steady Progress in Sixth Five-Year Plan Period, British Broadcasting Corp.; Summary of
World Broadcasts, Sept. 17, 1985, at FE/8058/CI/1 (NEXIS library, BBCSWB file).
18 Id.
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industry, for example, has long been considered in the third category.
Recent reforms, however, demonstrate that many aspects of aviation are
now being treated as either heavy industry (the production of planes) or
as service (the air transport of people and cargo). Correspondingly, sys-
tematic and comprehensive reforms have privatized decision-making au-
thority and introduced competition in aviation in a manner
unprecedented and unequaled in the recent Chinese experience.
II. AVIATION REFORM IN CHINA
A. Need for Reform
In 1950, China had twelve airplanes, carrying less than 10,000 pas-
sengers and less than 160,000 tons per kilometer of cargo. By 1983 the
situation had changed dramatically, with over 200 airplanes carrying al-
most 400,000 passengers and 650 million tons per kilometer of cargo.
Nonetheless, the industry remained extremely backward by international
standards.9 Even these higher figures represented only 2% of domestic
passenger transport and only 0.01% of cargo transport. At this rate,
China's aviation industry roughly equalled that of the Soviet Union in
the 1950s and trailed behind India and Brazil. Whereas other nations
experienced explosive growth in aviation between 1950 and 1980, China's
rate of growth lagged substantially. Indeed, China's fleet in the early
1980s represented less than 2% of the world's airplanes, and most of
these were vintage 1960s or before.2° This state of affairs placed a sub-
stantial drag on the burgeoning and lucrative tourist industry. The regu-
larity of long delays, poor service, slow and noisy airplanes, and the
inability to purchase tickets in advance, all combined to depress foreign
interest in China travel with a consequent loss of foreign currency.
The first major restructuring of the industry occurred on January 7,
1985, when the State Council approved the Report on Reforming the
Management Structure of the Civil Aviation Departments ("Report").
Intended to help implement the policy of invigorating the domestic econ-
omy and opening up China to foreign tourists, the Report focused on the
need to reform the decision-making structure which did not separate
government from private economic spheres of responsibility. The two
principles of reform are: 1) to separate government functions from enter-
prise functions; and 2) to simplify administration and to decentralize
power to local productive units.
19 Sheng, The Development of Our Civil Aviation Enterprise, INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Nov.
1984).




The Report called for the formation of independent civil aviation
enterprises responsible for providing service and accounting for their
own profits or losses. Enterprises would own aircraft, equipment, facto-
ries, and other fixed assets, and would be permitted to manage flights,
aircraft affairs, and their use of funds. Indeed, these enterprises were
given full decision-making power over production, management, use of
funds, establishment of organization, personnel systems, and dispensa-
tion of rewards or punishments to workers. "It is necessary that enter-
prises compete reasonably with each other, ensure safety in production,
improve service, and increase economic efficiency." 21
After the transfer of these economic functions from the government
to enterprises, the Civil Aviation Administration of China ("CAAC"),
will no longer be in direct charge of aviation operations. CAAC will
have an administrative role, but direct supervisory responsibility will be
transferred to provincial, municipal, and autonomous region civil avia-
tion bureaus. Furthermore, in order to unify and strengthen flight con-
trol, a number of aviation control centers will be established to
coordinate and direct flights. By involving local departments and sup-
porting them in running various enterprises in a planned manner, the
State Council intended to tap local enthusiasm so as to accelerate
growth. "It is necessary to establish, step by step, groups of aviation
enterprises at multiple levels and create a dynamic situation in which
backbone aviation enterprises, local aviation enterprises, and small avia-
tion enterprises coexist."22
CAAC will retain authority to approve the establishment of aviation
enterprises but without clear guidelines governing how approval deci-
sions may be made. All matters relating to the opening of international
routes are left to negotiation between the appropriate foreign entities and
CAAC-the exclusive international representative of the Chinese state
regarding aviation. Only CAAC may open domestic routes following ex-
amination and in accordance with stipulations. Furthermore, local de-
partments and enterprises may purchase aircraft for civil use upon
preparation of a purchasing plan approved by CAAC. Such aircraft may
be purchased only through CAAC's coordination and oversight in order
to present a united front when dealing with foreign aircraft corporations.
Even without the State Council's Report, the Chinese aviation in-
dustry would have experienced substantial changes over the past two
years. By 1985, transport tonnage had doubled from the 1980 rate and
21 China State Council Approves and Transmits the CAAC's Report on Reform of the CAAC Sys-
tem, People's Daily, Jan. 14, 1985.
22 Id.
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eighty new domestic and international routes had been added, bringing
the total to 267-an increase of approximately 60%. CAAC added
nearly 100 imported jets to its fleets between 1980-1985, bringing the to-
tal number of planes to 460 and increasing passsenger seats by 70%. In
1985 alone, China bought thirty jumbo jets and built or expanded sixteen
civilian airports.2 3 Such growth represented the beginning of an antici-
pated explosion in the prospects for Chinese aviation. By 1990, China
expects to transport sixteen million people annually and 2,500 million
tons per kilometer of cargo. Between 1985-1990, the top priority will be
to develop new routes, including short-haul flights radiating from major
cities to more remote areas and to increase the number of international
routes and flights to Japan, the United States, and Europe.2 4 Yet while
the forces spurring on this growth existed independently of the State
Council's reforms, the speed of the reforms' implementation and their
wide-ranging impact on the Chinese system of economic organization are
remarkable, especially in an industrial sector weighed down by historical
backwardness.
A close examination of these initial aviation reforms reveals four
critical aspects of Chinese economic reform which, when understood,
can help illuminate the direction of Chinese policy.
1) Competition among airlines-Twenty-three airlines provide
more service to more markets, thereby demonstrating the benefits of
competition in the Chinese aviation marketplace.
2) Domestic production of aircraft-There has been a signifi-
cant shift away from the purchase of foreign-made airplanes to the
domestic production of planes by Chinese companies unaffiliated
with the airlines.
3) Civilianization of aviation-The role of the military in avia-
tion has changed from one of absolute control to a mere supporting
role.
4) Sharpened focus of CAAC-Formerly the supervisor of all
aspects of Chinese civil aviation, CAAC is now primarily responsi-
ble for route allocation, airports, and air traffic control.
B. Creation and Operation of Competitive Airlines
Within months after the issuance of the State Council's reforms,
eleven regional aviation enterprises were established to provide transport
23 Statement by CAAC Director-General Hu i Zhou, Xinhua Gen. Overseas Serv., Feb. 19,
1986, item no. 021931 (NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
24 Growth of Civil Aviation in the PRC, Interavia Air Letter, Apr. 3, 1986, at 3 (quoting Hu Yi
Zhou)(NEXIS library, AIRLTR file).
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services. In the isolated province of Xinjiang, the Xinjiang Civil Avia-
tion Company, jointly owned by the province and by CAAC, provides
passenger and cargo transport, mail transport, and professsional aviation
services with twenty airplanes. This enterprise performs a service as an
extension of CAAC in an area where CAAC had not provided significant
service. Similarly, the Yunnan Aviation Corporation and the Heilongji-
ang Aviation Corporation are each a joint venture between the provincial
authorities and CAAC and will provide local service which previously
had not been adequately provided.
By contrast, the remaining eight regional airlines essentially re-
placed CAAC management by providing passenger and cargo transport
to and from nearby provinces. The Xiamen Aviation Ltd. Company,
formed in March 1984, is the oldest of the regional airlines.2" The largest
and most competitively important regional airline is Shanghai Airlines
which from its inception has attempted to replace CAAC service from
China's most populous and centrally located metropolis. A similar pat-
tern is reflected in the formation of regional airlines based in Beijing,
Guangzhou, Shenyang, Chengdu, Xi'an, and Lanzhou-Dalian.
Shanghai Airlines has provided the most competition to CAAC and
calls itself the "first independent airline in China."26 The airline is
owned in part by a consortium of Shanghai's leading hotels. As Shang-
hai is the center of the civilian aircraft manufacturing industry in China,
Shanghai Airlines serves the fastest growing aviation hub in China. With
these advantages have also come strong impediments. CAAC dictated
aircraft purchases until Shanghai Airlines purchased five used Boeing
707s from the United States in cash. In response, CAAC prevented
Shanghai Airlines from flying the planes for months. Other problems
have involved allocation of profits between international and domestic
routes (as profits from international routes go to CAAC exclusively).
Profit allocation is compounded by CAAC's establishment of fixed rates
for all airlines. With these limitations on its ability to compete, Shanghai
Airlines has devoted considerable attention to the selection and training
of flight crews and attendants. The airline has established a training
center for employees to learn Western standards of appearance, flight
knowledge, and foreign languages. With regulated air fares, the main
arena of competition will be in-flight service, where Shanghai Airlines
25 Xiamen Aviation Ltd. Company Set Up, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Mar. 4, 1984, item
no. 030449 (NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
26 Shanghai Airlines Plans to Lure Passengers from National Carrier, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 3, 1986, at 34.
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could provide an attractive alternative to the state-owned carrier.
27
Chinese aviation enterprises have not been limited to regional air-
lines providing general passenger and cargo transport services. Six enter-
prises have been established to provide specialized services. The
Industrial Aviation Services Corporation is the largest aviation enterprise
providing air photography, geological exploration (for minerals and oil),
and fire and forest protection. Based at the Wushu airport in Taiyuan,
this enterprise has established subsidiaries for service to other regions.
Similarly, three helicopter businesses have been established recently to
service the needs of industry-particularly the oil industry. These com-
panies are the Guangzhou Helicopter Corporation, the China Ocean He-
licopter Corporation (located in the Shenzhen Economic Zone), and the
China Capital Helicopter Corporation (headquartered in Beijing).
A third group of enterprises established within a year of the initial
reforms are two joint ventures with colorful names. The Flying Dragon
Professional Aviation Corporation was jointly formed by the Ministry of
Aviation Industry and the Ministry of Geology and Mines. Its scope is
geological investigation, mine exploration, and chemical spraying. The
Rising Dragon Goods-Transport Corporation is a joint venture based in
Beijing between the China Bank and the Beijing Trust and Advisory
Company. Each of these six companies represents a corporate venture
unimaginable only a few years ago and each provides a particular service
to both public and private entities which previously had not been
provided.
The formation of these seventeen companies demonstrates a funda-
mental principle of enhanced market coverage as a monopolized industry
opens to new participants. CAAC-entrenched in Beijing, facing dilapi-
dated technology and untrained personnel-had attempted to build a na-
tional infrastructure for a fledgling aviation industry. Not surprisingly,
these attempts concentrated on the high-volume core functions of airline
service between China's major cities. Compared to the need for service
between Beijing-Shanghai-Guangzhou, the needs of more remote prov-
inces received less attention. By establishing provincial airlines with the
sole priority of developing aviation locally, resources could be efficiently
allocated to respond to immediate needs and opportunities, thereby mak-
ing aviation more available to areas previously without service. Market
coverage has similarly been enhanced by the establishment of particular-
ized helicopter corporations which concentrate their efforts on discrete




These are noteworthy developments for traders and travellers, but,
strictly speaking, this increased market coverage suggests only a limited
aspect of competition. Rather than providing head-to-head competition,
these enterprises provide what economists term "yardstick" competition
because they enable consumers and regulators to compare quality of ser-
vice and efficiency among a variety of enterprises. Where a monopolist's
higher than necessary costs or less than appropriate service might not be
recognized, the existence of seventeen different airline companies permits
comparison. However, competition typically implies not only that per-
formance may be compared but that real benefits will go to those exercis-
ing advantageous skill, ingenuity, or effort. As long as air fares were set
uniformly by CAAC and as long as China's aviation enterprises refrain
from providing the competitive service over identical routes, Chinese avi-
ation reforms displayed only a limited acceptance of the principles of
market economics.
Recognizing that comparison does not mean competition and that
the formation of localized or specialized enterprises is only the first stage
of a lengthy reform process, CAAC has recently announced the estab-
lishment of six major airlines to operate international and domestic serv-
ices along with the seventeen existing enterprises.28 China International
Airways (Beijing) will operate mainly international routes, service to
Hong Kong, and some domestic routes. China Eastern Airways (Shang-
hai) will operate air service to Japan and Hong Kong and will also fly
some domestic air routes. China Southern Airways (Guangzhou) will
operate domestic air routes and service Hong Kong and southeast Asian
countries. China Southwest Airways (Chengdu) will mainly fly domestic
routes and provide service to Tibet, Burma, and Thailand. China North-
west Airways (Xi'an) will provide domestic service focusing on cargo
carriage. China Northern Airways (Shenyang) will operate primarily do-
mestic service. According to the announced plan, CAAC will no longer
provide air service, and the six national airlines will "push China's air
service to a new stage of competition and development."29 The new air-
lines are authorized to negotiate and sign contracts directly with foreign
airline companies, tourist agencies, cargo agents, and other organiza-
tions. Most important, the airlines will have control over their fares,
leading a CAAC official to predict that "fare wars" are likely to occur.30
28 China To Establish Six Airline Companies, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Feb. 13, 1987,
item no. 0213173 (NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
29 Reform To Improve China's Air Service, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Feb. 21, 1987,
item no. 0221123 (NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
30 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:1(1987)
It is premature to predict the effects of the establishment of six na-
tional airlines in China. Yet it is inescapable that, within less than two-
and-one-half years, the Chinese aviation industry has gone from a state-
owned monopoly operated by national regulators, to an industry of spe-
cialized and regional airlines with prospects of competitive fares and
routes.31 Indeed, in no other sector of the Chinese socialist economy is
the commitment to introduce market forces as manifestly dynamic as in
aviation.
Yet, difficult questions remain. What incentives are there for better
performance? If rates are fixed and routes assigned by CAAC, will the
multiplicity of enterprises be competitively dynamic, or will the firms
lapse into collusion? Who will have real authority to resolve competitive
conflicts such as when the performance of an aggressive competitor in-
fringes on the territory of a weaker competitor? However, China has
made profound structural changes, the importance of which should not
be minimized. However, for all the market interaction, there is scarce
contemplation of anticompetitive contact. Will China's aviation enter-
prises fix prices, divide markets, exclude upstarts and agressive competi-
tors, restrain technological creativity, and extract exorbitant fares from
consumers? Chinese pronouncements on such matters suggest that since
such conduct should not occur, it will not occur. This belief is based
either upon an understanding that the system remains authoritative at
the top through CAAC and, ultimately, the Communist Party, or a na-
ivete regarding the tendency of unregulated competition to create unfore-
seen costs as well as benefits. From the perspective of an observer
adhering to the tenets of Western liberalism, it is hoped that the latter is
true and that reason and experience will lead to the enactment of a re-
fined legal foundation upon which dynamic competition may take place.
C. Domestication of Aircraft Production
A critical reason why reforms in aviation are important for China is
that the demands that aviation makes on related industrial sectors. At
minimum, of course, aviation requires aircraft. These could be
purchased from foreign manufacturers and, traditionally, the Chinese
have done exactly that. However, a guiding principle of Chinese market
economics is to meet demand with nationally available technology; to be
subject to the caprice of foreign producers can be destabilizing, particu-
larly for a developing nation such as China. Consequently, the Chinese
have begun to produce domestic aircraft.
31 Let a Thousand Airlines Sprout, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 1986, at 68.
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Foreign aircraft producers have historically dominated the Chinese
aviation industry, a fact of considerable importance to Chinese industrial
leaders. Most of the passenger planes used by CAAC during the 1950s
and 1960s came from the Soviet Union. During the 1970s, China bought
thirty-five Trident aircraft from Great Britain and more than thirty jets
from the United States Boeing Company and McDonnell Douglas Cor-
poration.32 These purchases were among the first and most important
commercial transactions between the People's Republic and the West.
Indeed, aircraft technology was the first choice of technological and
trade cooperation with the United States. Chinese officials have stressed
the need to import Western aircraft technology as well as to encourage
aircraft technology transfer and joint development with United States
and European plane manufacturers.33
With CAAC reforms announced in January 1985, China's inade-
quate fleet was viewed as an impediment to the likely acceleration of
China's civil aviation business. It was not surprising that, within weeks
of the announcement of the reforms, China concluded the largest aircraft
contract in its history, purchasing nineteen late model passenger aircraft
from foreign manufacturers.34 Indeed, this purchase launched a series of
extensive foreign aircraft purchases as CAAC expanded services with
projections of expending nearly $1 billion dollars in 1985 on imported
jetliners.35 Within months, international competition for large-scale civil
aircraft orders intensified as purchases of more and better aircraft failed
to satisfy the surge in aviation demand. In the first half of 1985, CAAC
purchased three Airbus Industrie A310-200s, ten Soviet Tupoloev Tu-
154s, eight Short Brothers SD360s, two Boeing 737-300 twinjets, eight
Boeing transports, and signed a letter of understanding for ten British
Aerospace 146-100s.36 Simultaneously, CAAC reached an agreement
with McDonnell Douglas to coproduce up to forty MD-82 aircraft by
1992 in its Shanghai facility.37
[T]he next few years will see a big development in China's civil aviation,
thanks to the current policy of opening to the outside world and enlivening
32 China Buys New Planes to Modernize Civil Air Fleet, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Jan.
29, 1985, item no. 012924 [hereinafter New Planes](NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
33 Chinese and U.S. Officials Hold Talks on Aviation and Aerospace, Xinhua Gen. Overseas
News Serv., July 23, 1984, item no. 072343 (NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
34 New Planes, supra note 32.
35 China Plans to Buy Aircraft from British Aerospace, Reuters News Serv., Apr. 25, 1985
(NEXIS library, Reuter file).
36 China's Economic Reform Spurs CivilAircraft Demand, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 3,
1985, at 73-74.
37 China Buys Eight New Boeing Jetliners, Associated Press, May 22, 1985 (NEXIS library, AP
file).
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the domestic economy .... China will buy even more modem airplanes in
the next few years in order to modernize its civil air fleet. The aircraft
market is a large one, and foreign aircraft manufacturers all over the
world.. .are welcome to compete for orders in China .... 3
8
These purchases, however, have placed an enormous strain on Chi-
nese finances and have drained a considerable amount of foreign cur-
rency. Chinese aviation was caught between the need for aircraft to
service the lucrative and surging tourist demand and the need to retain
currency for domestic development. The only viable long-term solution
was to develop a domestic aircraft manufacturing industry. In Novem-
ber 1985, Vice Premier Wan Li declared that China should not import
aircraft that could be made by domestic manufacturers and announced
the introduction of two new passenger aircraft to complement China's
existing aircraft servicing industrial, agricultural, and oil prospecting
needs.39 Six months later, at the United States Aerospace Industry Exhi-
bition in Beijing, China's Minister of Aviation, Mo WenXi'ang, an-
nounced that foreign aircraft manufacturers wishing to deal in China will
have to do so through cooperative programs that transfer advanced tech-
nology to Chinese partner companies so that China will have the capabil-
ity to participate in international aerospace projects starting with
research, development, and design phases."0
In the year following this announcement, China has carefully pur-
sued parallel development policies: relying on competitive purchasing
from foreign manufacturers to meet the ever increasing demand for ser-
vice while simultaneously requiring technology transfer and cooperation
with which to establish rapidly a domestic infrastructure capable of obvi-
ating the reliance on foreigners. One noteworthy aspect of this parallel
policy has been the implementation of competitive bidding whenever for-
eign involvement is required. For example, this competition recently led
to a switch from Pratt and Whitney engines which powered newly ac-
quired Boeing aircraft to engines built by General Electric."
The effort to replace foreign purchases with domestic production is
receiving ever greater emphasis. Of the thirty airplanes scheduled to be
38 Statement of Hu YiZhou, Director-General of CAAC, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., May
23, 1985, item no. 052388 (NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
39 Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Nov. 22, 1985, item no. 112251 (NEXIS library, Xinhua
file).
40 Fink, China's Technology Leap, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 26, 1986, at 11.
41 Airline Observer, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 19, 1987, at 35. Demonstrating the same
spirit of competition, the Ministry of Aviation Industry has called for the submission of competitive
proposals from Boeing Co., McDonnell Douglas Corp., and Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm, GmbH,
for development and production of a 150-seat civilian airplane. See PRC to Participate in New Air-
craft Development, Interavia Air Letter, Mar. 6, 1987, at 7 (NEXIS library, AIRLTR file).
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added to the fleet in 1987, eighteen will be foreign-made and twelve will
be built in China.42 This is only the beginning as China plans to manu-
facture more than 200 aircraft by 1990, augmented by a government allo-
cation of 1.2 billion yuan ($500 million) for research into new types of
aircraft and for upgrading domestic aircraft.43 "China Aviation '86"-
China's premier display of its best aviation machinery and technology
held in Shanghai in December 1986-and China's participation in the
Hanover Fair in April 1987, symbolize the entry of China into the inter-
national market of high-technology aviation manufacturing."
D. Civilianization of Aviation
Until recently, aviation in China was strictly a function of the mili-
tary. Civil aviation was long nonexistent and was only introduced as a
minor adjunct to military service for the benefit of bureaucratic and com-
mercial cadres. In light of this history and the emphasis placed by the
Four Modernizations on strengthening national security, a dedication of
available aviation resources to military purposes would not have been
surprising. That the opposite appears to be true is a significant statement
about future Chinese goals and policies.
Chinese civilianization is especially significant because, in contrast
to many Western nations, there was little civilian industrial infrastruc-
ture to take advantage of the high technology developed by or for the
military. That many nations have developed an aviation industry in-
dependent of the military is, of course, considerable tribute to those re-
gimes which recognized the benefits of civil commerce. In most cases,
however, there were entrepreneurs in related civilian industries who
could assume responsibility and there was a prior established legal foun-
dation applicable to entrants in the fledgling aviation industry. In China,
the dominant organizational reference has been the military, and no com-
mercial law statutes existed before 1977. China certainly perceives hos-
tile foreign powers against which an effective air force could provide
deterence. China would not have been the only nation to militarize avia-
tion development and, in light of its domestic and international position,
such action would not have been surprising. Yet, without jeopardizing
its real security, China eschewed militarization of the civilian sector
42 China's Civil Air Fleet to Get 30 New Aircraft, Xinhau Gen. Overseas News Serv., Feb. 6,
1987, item no. 02061032 (NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
43 Increased R&D Expenditure in PRC, Interavia Air Letter, Mar. 6, 1987, at 8 (NEXIS library,
AIRLTR file).
44 In Shanghai: Civil Aviation '86, INTERAVIA AEROSPACE REV., Feb. 1987, at 109-10.
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while using military resources for civilian benefit. This policy choice has
made a difference.
In the early 1980s, the output of goods produced by civilian enter-
prises under the direct control of the ministries of nuclear, astronautics,
ordnance, and aviation industries was 18% of total gross national prod-
uct. By 1985, that percentage had more than doubled to 40%. It was
hardly coincidental that at the same time that Chinese officials called for
the development of a domestic aircraft manufacturing industry, Vice Pre-
mier Li Peng, in a closing address at a national conference on the techno-
logical transformation of defense industry enterprises, called upon the
defense industry to provide nonmilitary sectors with technology and
equipment for the purpose of producing scientific research and civilian
goods.45 It appears that the military accepted this responsibility. In
1985, the Air Force opened thirteen airports for civilian use, bringing the
total number of civilian airports to fifty and transferred twenty-four addi-
tional planes to civil aviation departments.4 6 Perhaps the best demon-
stration of national support for aviation growth was the willingness of
senior military leaders to commit the power and prestige of the armed
forces to modernizing the aviation industry and adapting it to civilian
needs.47 This emphasis on civilianization and its rapid success may be
unparalleled by any other nation in this decade.
There are at least two conclusions which may be drawn from these
public pronouncements and recent trends. First, they strongly support
the proposition that China is serious about developing its domestic civil-
ian aircraft industry. So serious are Chinese officials that they are willing
to enlist the military to aid in the endeavor. Second, they imply that
China may be serious about reducing the size and expense of the military
sector as indicated by decreasing the armed forces by one million person-
nel. It is difficult to know if those in power in China will continue to
pursue a policy of demilitarization and civilianization of industrial pro-
duction. Developments in the aviation sector suggest that the policy is
more than mere rhetoric. Thus, the Ministry of Aviation Industry is
gradually shifting personnel toward a goal of having 60% of all person-
nel involved in civil projects and 40% in military programs and is also
considering diversifying into nonaerospace civilian products such as
45 Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Nov. 21, 1985, item no. 112187 (NEXIS library, Xinhua
file).
46 Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Dec. 24, 1985, item no. 122427 (NEXIS library, Xinhua
file).
47 Statement of Defense Minister Zhang Aiping, quoted in China Looks Abroad for Help in Devel-
oping Plane Industry, Reuters News Serv., Jan. 12, 1985 (NEXIS library, Reuter file). A similar
statement was made by Zhang Ting Fa, Commander of the Air Force, Worker's Daily, Feb. 4, 1985.
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heavy machinery and automobiles. At a minimum, these developments
permit Chinese officials to claim that they are making a significant contri-
bution to world peace. As Aviation Minister Mo WenXi'ang recently
proclaimed: "Many countries talk of disarmament, but do not do any-
thing. China is doing something.
4
E. Refined Delineation of CAAC's Role
Before the recent reforms, CAAC had the undifferentiated task of
promoting and regulating aviation in China. All decisions-which air-
craft to employ, what routes to serve, what prices to charge, how to safe-
guard against accidents, how to impose liability in the event of cargo
damage or personal injury-were within CAAC's authority. For most of
its history, CAAC decisions were made without the benefit of established
or codified rules, but were ad hoe responses to general policy pronounce-
ments. Notably absent was any provision allowing for the appeal of a
decision to any legally authorized reviewer. CAAC was empowered to
control aviation; any limitation on that power came in the form of direct
supervision by higher governmental agents.
This bureaucratic structure created inconsistent determinations, in-
fighting, and inefficiency, all of which combined to interfere with the
modernization of aviation. Recognition of these problems was a major
cause for the aviation reforms which decentralized CAAC authority and
established competitive airlines. Yet these reforms would have been
form without substance if CAAC had retained omnipotence over the in-
dustry. It was necessary, therefore, to carve out certain tasks which must
be undertaken by a national regulatory body, to delegate performance of
these tasks to CAAC, and to limit CAAC to accomplishment of only
these tasks. So far, the strong rhetorical commitment to delineating
CAAC's role has brought some progressive restructuring of the bureau-
cracy. Nonetheless, questions remain as to the actual implementation of
a legal system capable of differentiating authority, assigning responsibil-
ity, and providing appropriate review.
On January 8, 1986, one year after the announcement of the reforms
of the management structure of aviation, the State Council issued provi-
sional regulations on the role of CAAC regarding other airlines and re-
garding aviation safety. The regulations stipulate that CAAC has
plenary authority over all civil aviation in China. Any enterprise seeking
to operate an aviation business must apply for a license which will be
reviewed by CAAC. If the application is accepted, the license will be
48 China's Aviation Minister Mo Welcomes Western Collaboration, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
May 26, 1986, at 20-21.
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granted. This procedure is identical to past procedure, the major change
is the identification of conditions required for licensing approval. The
conditions now require registration of all aircraft and proof of airworthi-
ness, the presentation of the licenses of flight and aircraft maintenance
crews and flight dispatchers, and demonstration that airfields and condi-
tions for mechanical maintenance will ensure normal flight and
operation.
Only after receiving a business license may enterprises begin opera-
tions. Once a license is obtained, enterprises may engage in general avia-
tion business even outside China. The regulations also call for the
adoption of effective measures to protect the environment and govern
basic ticketing matters and procedures for allocating air routes.4 9 These
regulations did not significantly alter previous practices, but, by codify-
ing those practices, the regulations put all interested parties on notice as
to what standards they must meet and what will be the likely conse-
quences of noncompliance. In that sense, the regulations go a long way
toward removing caprice from the adminstration of Chinese aviation.
Despite these codifications, there is still concern that CAAC will use
its position of authority to promote its institutional interests or to disad-
vantage unfavored competitive airlines. Chinese officials have attempted
to dispel these concerns by proclaiming that all civil aviation enterprises
will be treated on a nondiscriminatory basis and that all airports will be
open to all enterprises.50 As of yet, there is no statutory requirement that
CAAC be fair and objective, nor is there any system of legal review for
any enterprise which might believe that it was treated unjustly. Indeed,
the competitive relationships among the airlines and CAAC have not
been officially addressed. This is significant especially with regard to
route allocation and rate-making-the two primary aspects of competi-
tion among the airlines. CAAC appears to retain authority over these
matters by proclaiming the virtues of competition but without mandating
lawful competition or even defining the permissible conditions of entry,
pricing, or service competition.
The area in which CAAC has acted most affirmatively as a regulator
in promoting the interests of all aviation enterprises is in the establish-
ment of an independent system for supervising air traffic control. On
February 10, 1987, simultaneous with the announcement that six re-
49 The CAAC Takes Over all Responsibility for Civilian "Flight Activities," British Broadcasting
Corp.; Summary of World Broadcasts, Jan. 31, 1986, at FE/8171/BII/1 (NEXIS library, BBCSWB
file).
50 National Conference on Civil Aviation: Role of the CAAC, British Broadcasting Corp.; Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 9, 1986, at FE/8333/BII/15 (NEXIS library, BBCSWB file).
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gional air carriers would be established, Chinese officials announced the
establishment of the Air Traffic Control Commission ("Commission").
The Commission will establish a nationwide air traffic control network
and take responsibility for the air traffic control towers around the coun-
try.51 Significantly, the Commission will be controlled by the State
Council instead of the Air Force. The newly appointed Director is a
civilian, Guo Yunzhong, former Deputy Director of CAAC. The Air
Force will officially turn over air traffic control power to the new Com-
mission later in 1987.
In the 1950s, China's air traffic control was under exclusively mili-
tary control. With the development of civil aviation, a divided adminis-
trative system, based on the Soviet Union's model, allocated authority
over military aircraft to the military, civilian aircraft to CAAC, and in-
dustrial aircraft to the Ministry of Aeronautics Industry. In the event
that an aircraft of one department used an air lane under the control of
another department, the first aircraft would have to delay its flight to
give way to aircraft affiliated with the second department. In the event of
an emergency within an area controlled by a different department, the
imperiled plane would have to ask for approval to alter its flight plan
from authorities at many levels. Now with over 10,000 military and civil
aircraft in China, this- antedated and arguably irrational system is no
longer suited to handle the fast pace and large volume of air traffic con-
templated by recent aviation reforms. The Chinese have recognized the
need for a single authority under civilian control, one which is expressly
empowered to provide essential safety and health regulations to all air-
lines on a nondiscriminatory basis.
The new Commission is also significant because it intentionally imi-
tates the United States Federal Aviation Administration and its organi-
zational responsibilities. Thus, the Commission is the child of the State
Council and the Central Military Commission which, in 1985, estab-
lished a committee to control air traffic. The Commission is the execu-
tive organ of that committee with initial responsibility to: 1) divide
jurisdiction over the country's air space between regional authorities; 2)
codify regulations for the nation's air traffic control; and 3) coordinate
the work of aviation departments regarding traffic control. To accom-
plish these tasks, new radar and computer data processing systems will
soon be installed along with modern communcations equipment.52
51 China to Reform Air Traffic Control System, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Feb. 10,
1987, item no. 0210083 (NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
52 Hongkong Paper on Setting Up Air Traffic Control Bureau, British Broadcasting Corp.; Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 11, 1987, at FE/8489/BII/I (NEXIS library, BBCSWB file).
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Immediately after the announcement of the new Commission, the
Director-General of CAAC announced that civilian airports will become
an independent unit coordinated by a service administration yet to be
formed which would handle aerial information, telecommunications,
navigation, and weather reports. While the designation of international
airports will continue to require CAAC action, local airports will now be
able to make direct contacts with foreign airlines and import advanced
technology and equipment.53
With this recent flurry of bureaucratic restructuring, China is dem-
onstrating some appreciation of the principles of market regulation under
law. First, most industrialized nations have authority over aviation
safety (licensing of airlines, planes, personnel, and control over air traffic)
vested in a national authority. As a general proposition, safety regula-
tion is not left to market forces but is considered an aspect of police
power belonging to the state. China's willingness to separate safety is-
sues from economic issues is, therefore, a significant initial step toward
modern industrial organization. Second, the administrative systems of
many industrialized nations have attempted to carve out discrete safety
issues and assign them to bureaus staffed with experts who can be free
from bias in enforcing the public's need for safety. Third, most industri-
alized nations have a well-defined organizational hierarchy which con-
nects the supreme levels of the government with administrative agencies
authorized to execute safety regulations. These agencies, in turn, have
licensing authority over the numerous competing private enterprises and
provide, by law, the required minimum of safety protection. Fourth, the
guidelines and rules of this entire system are on notice to all interested
parties and should be applied equally to all.
III. THE REFORMS IN PERSPECTIVE
In Reliance on Law, written during the Warring States period (475-
221 B.C.), Guan Zhong instructed that a good monarch would rely on
law and not on wisdom--otherwise the state would be in disorder.
Nearly a millenium and a half later, China had a dynamic economy char-
acterized by a strong central government built upon a bureaucratic dele-
gation of authority outward both across geographic regions and through
commercial sectors. That economy was perhaps the closest model to
competitive private enterprise that appeared anywhere on Earth before
the eighteenth century. Certainly, Chinese culture has long believed that
society is well-served by individuals exercising initiative and providing
53 China's Civil Airports Open to All Airlines, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Feb. 13, 1987,
item no. 0213162 (NEXIS library, Xinhua file).
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needed goods and services for the people in return for compensation
commensurate with that entrepreneurial effort. For centuries, however,
these fundamental values, which could support and stabilize a productive
economy, have tended to be demonstrated off the mainland.
For at least the past century, within China itself, a succession of
foreign invaders and inner turmoil substantially undermined China's eco-
nomic base and prevented the development of stable legal systems. Rules
governing civil matters were treated as part of the criminal law with
criminal sanctions for violations-a fact hardly conducive to en-
trepreneurial risk taking. Sporadic attempts by the Kuomintang prior to
1949 and even by the People's Republic in the early 1950s to draft a civil
code governing commercial relations failed to establish a system for de-
veloping an economy subject to consistent and fair legal regulation. With
the advent of the Great Leap Forward, measures devised to develop a
commodity economy were rejected in favor of rigid state control over the
economy. Subsequently, the Cultural Revolution encouraged a nihilistic
rejection of both law and commerce and especially of liberal ideas favor-
ing a system of competitive rivalry according to rules.
This rejection can be seen as deriving, albeit radically, from well-
springs deep within Chinese culture. The Chinese interpretation of com-
petition more nearly approximates the West's conception of strife. This
interpretation is reflected in the way that many Chinese tend to view the
West: excessively aggressive and competitve to the point that individuals
are quarrelsome and nations are saber rattling. Chinese philosophy
stresses the value of individual patience through integration into the so-
cial fabric and the necessary submersion of greed and ambition in favor
of the general well-being.54 Thus, as in most things human, there are
contradictory motifs in the Chinese experience which have received vary-
ing emphasis during different periods of time. The twenty years between
the advent of the Great Leap Forward and the trial of the Gang of Four
witnessed an adoption of extreme principles favoring a strong central au-
thority and the dominance of the individual by the group. However, ex-
tremism is not a favored value of the Chinese, despite the extraordinary
turbulence of the last century.
The hallmark of Chinese tradition and culture that is the Confucian
legacy from 2,500 years ago asserts the ideal of moderation and balance.
It is this ideal which must be the cornerstone of a progressive regime.
The economic modernizations of this decade appear to be sensitive to
that ideal because they call for the development of legal systems capable
54 H. CREEL, CHINESE THOUGHT FROM CONFUCIUS TO MAO TSE-TUNG 258-60 (1953).
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of adjusting complex commercial relations. That codified rules applica-
ble to all should regulate the multilayered relations between the State and
private enterprises and between private enterprises and individuals is not
a new idea in China. It is simply an idea that was buried alive until the
last few years.
An important early act of the Deng XiaoPing regime called for the
codification of regulations guiding proprietary relations between individ-
uals and enterprises. This ultimately led to the Economic Contract Law
which was enacted in 1981. Efforts to draft a complete civil code, how-
ever, have been handicapped by a primitive economic infrastructure and
a lack of experience with disputes generated by market activity. Never-
theless, laws governing patents, inheritance, and economic contracts with
foreigners were enacted in the early 1980s. Perhaps of greatest impor-
tance is the Draft Common Rules of Civil Law which set forth regula-
tions on most issues common in civilian and commercial life. The draft
law grants legal status to domestic, foreign, and joint economic ventures
and entitles these entities to stipulated civil rights including the right to
own property, collect debts, and retain title to proprietary rights includ-
ing inventions. Furthermore, the draft law allocates the burden of legal
liabilities and specifies basic principles of ethical participation in the so-
cial economic order." These legislative efforts, which produced over
fifty statutes since 1979, generally should be viewed as steps toward mod-
eration-as indications that the Confucian ideal of balance is gradually
being revived by the development of regulatory law.
Confucius, however, never had to cope with developing and control-
ling a modern aviation system. Indeed, it is the very nature of aviation as
the product of twentieth century high technology, closely affiliated with
military and national security efforts, which makes reform in this area so
worthy of comment. More than reform in the fields of agriculture or
textiles, reform of aviation compels those in authority to make difficult
policy choices which test and define the current Chinese commitment to
a "market economy with Chinese characteristics." Evidence as of early
1987 suggests grounds for cautious encouragement.
The establishment of twenty-three airlines in recent years demon-
strates more than a rhetorical commitment to the idea that competition
tends to be economically beneficial. Even a mere rhetorical commitment
to the virtues of competition would be significant compared to the Chi-
nese attitude only a decade ago. By multiplying the number of market
participants so rapidly, and by giving them independent legal status, the
55 China's Civil Laws to Enter a New Stage, China Daily, Mar. 12, 1986, at 4.
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Chinese have forced themselves to witness the consequences of competi-
tion in a highly visible and economically crucial industrial sector.
The separation of government from economic functions in a sector
dominated by government personnel and demanding of government reg-
ulation signifies a demonstrable commitment to restraining state author-
ity. This raises what may be the most important politial question facing
China at present: to what extent is this powerful nation, historically ruled
by the Emperor, going to impose limitations on the exercise of real power
by those in command? It is difficult to know--current events may be
temporary fads or the precursors of profound developments. It would be
fatuous to point to reforms in aviation and suggest that China is demon-
strably adopting the principles of government under law as proclaimed
by Western constitutional democracies. However, it would be unduly
cynical to view the march of common principles through agricultural
reform to aviation reform without acknowledging that serious efforts are
being made to decentralize economic authority.
By focusing on the structural relationships between administrative
units and private enterprise, the Chinese have necessarily compelled the
development of legal systems capable of shaping and solidifying these
relationships over time and in response to a myriad of unforeseen contin-
gencies. Whether this compulsion was intentional is a matter of opinion,
but its geopolitical significance is clearer. The Chinese construction of
legal systems to regulate market competition strictly limiting state au-
thority has, at this point, sufficient momentum that it can be derailed
only by a deliberate effort having catastrophic consequences for eco-
nomic progress.
This does not ignore the fragility of new legal systems, nor should
there be naivete regarding the power of central government authorities to
entrench their dominant position. It may be noted, however, that many
nations face the risk that their regulated competitive economies may be
undermined or even rejected by authoritarian regimes. China today faces
this risk perhaps more than others because of its recent history. It is
pointless to predict the unknown, but it may be pertinent to ask: to what
extent will the principles of aviation reform spread to other industrial
sectors, especially sectors involving high technology? Furthermore, a
watchful eye might examine the subtle details of these developing legal
systems to determine if they succeed in implementing the policies of re-
form while advancing elementary principles of justice and due process of
law.
Mention should be made of what has not been accomplished regard-
ing aviation reform and what this foretells. The system for allocating
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routes provides no systematic method of maximizing competition among
the airlines. The competitive implications of granting a new route to one
corporation rather than another do not even have to be considered.
While the most recent reforms call for competition over fares, there is
ambiguity over the extent and nature of such competition. Furthermore,
there do not appear to be codified prohibitions against anticompetitive
restraints which inevitably occur in competitive markets: price fixing or
market division agreements among private enterprises, exclusionary
treatment of especially aggressive or successful competitors, or predatory
interference with a competitor's business. How will mergers or joint ven-
tures among airlines be evaluated? Similarly, what protections against
restraints affecting consumers-such as tying arrangements-will be en-
acted and who will be responsible for enforcing those protections?
China's long march into the next millenium has as yet taken only a
few short steps. While the distance this nation must cover to become a
world leader is prodigious, China has impressive strengths, including the
advantage of not being tied down to the technologies and organizational
systems of an industrial past-much of China's progress may be built on
essentially a tabula rasa. The pace and direction of China's development
are not for a United States law professor to forecast, but perhaps the
recent aviation reforms suggest that there exists a principled commit-
ment to economic and social progress grounded in a strong appreciation
of the role of law as regulator of economic conduct. If so, it is to be
commended.
